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SEMINAR
MARITAL PROPERTY AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
"Mine is better than ours."
Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanac (1756)
There exist in the United States today two distinctly dis-
similar systems of law governing marital property. The maj-
ority of the states essentially follow the common law rule with
certain statutory modifications of dower and courtesy. Of
these common law states, only North Dakota' and South Da-
kota 2 have abolished all marital property interests. The sec-
ond system of marital property law exists in a number of
southern and western states.' This is the so called commun-
ity property system largely derived from the civil law. When
two such divergent systems of law prevail in a country with
so mobile a populace as the United States, a boundless variety
of conflict of laws questions must inevitably arise. A signifi-
cant number of these must necessarily accompany divorce and
settlement, when property, real and personal, may have been
acquired in a number of states across the country. The fre-
quency of such problems is not diminished by the ever increas-
ing number of divorces each year. I shall attempt to limit the
scope of this discussion to general considerations of marital
property with particular emphasis upon marital property law
as it pertains to divorce and subsequent property settlement.
This will be followed by some indications of the problems in
the enforcement of these decrees. Necessarily, I must refer
to cases dealing with descent and distribution, creditors rights,
etc., in those rather frequent areas which are lacking in di-
vorce litigation.
MARITAL PROPERTY
At the inception, it is only fitting that a property definition
of marital property be made. Professor Marsh, in his most
eminent treatise, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws,
has given the following definition:
"Any interest which a wife qua wife receives by opera-
1. N.D. Cent. Code §§ .14-07-04, 14-07-09, 56-01-02.
2. S.D. Code § 14.0203, 14.0206, 56.0103 (1939).
3. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas
and Washington.
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tion of law with respect to things owned or acquired by
her husband is a 'marital-property interest.' Similarly, the
aggregate of interests received by the husband in things
owned or acquired by the wife are his 'marital-property
interest." 4
It must be noted that in considering conflict of laws prob-
lems in relation to divorce the majority of conflict of laws
questions arising appear during litigation subsequent to the
divorce in which the former spouse is praying for a division
of property not obtained in the initial divorce proceeding.
This is true since any property settlement question presented
during the divorce action will probably be characterized by
the court as a question of divorce, not of marital property 5 and
thusly, they will apply the lex fori which usually provides
merely for an equitable distribution making no distinction be-
tween separate and marital property.6 It is rather when the
divorce proceedings have been silent as to any property settle-
ment, and the former spouse comes into court requesting a
division of property, that conflict of laws questions concerning
marital property present themselves.
There are two widely accepted and generally prevailing
rules governing marital property: (1) the law of the domicile
governs movables, 7 "mobilia personam sequuntur," (2) the law
of the situs governs immovables8 These rules are not all in-
clusive and are subject to some modification.
MOVABLES
The first area into which I shall delve is that concerning
movables. One of the early theories propounded in this field
was the "intended domicile" theory of the noted conflict of
laws authority, Justice Story.' In substance, this proposition
was that property acquired subsequent to the marriage and
before the spouses have reached their intended domicile, will
be governed by the laws of their intended domicile. This
4. MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (lst ed.
1952).
5. Yd. at 142.
6. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-24 (1961).
7. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 289 (1934); Rozan v. Rozan, 49
Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac.
796 (1912); Muus v. Muus, 29 Minn. 115, 12 N.W. 343 (1882); Boxman v. Hor-
der, 94 Ore. 219, 185 Pac. 741 (1919).
8. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 237 (1934); GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (3rd ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS at 7 (2nd ed. 1951); see, e.g., Newcomer v. Oren, 2 Md. 297, 56 Am.
Dec. 717 (1852).9. STORY. CONFLICT OF LAWS §9 193. 194 (3rd ed. 1846).
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theory has not been widely accepted and is often criticized in
its application to marital property.10 It is offered here only
to serve as a bit of history on the matter. Interestingly
enough, in the number of old cases in which this rule has found
favor, the intended domicile and the actual domicile of the hus-
band were one and the same. 1
A second early theory which also has fallen into ignominy is
the "tacit contract" theory.2 This theory was that marriage
is in the nature of a contract and contract principles should
apply insofar as making the law of the place where the con-
tract was consummated applicable. This theory was rather
quickly disposed of in the land mark case of Saul v. His Cred-
itors.'
3
Various circumstances which prevail upon the acquisition of
movables preclude the strict application of the fundamental
rule regarding this type of property. For example, if prop-
erty is acquired by the spouses in a community property state
and they subsequently remove to a common law state, there
establishing domicile and purchasing property with the pro-
ceeds realized from the sale of property previously acquired
in their former domicile, what law shall then govern? If the
law of their present domicile governs, then the spouse may
have no interest in the newly acquired property and is thus
divested of her property. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
in the case of Fleck v. Fleck 4 took cognizance of this problem
in quoting from a Washington case. 15
"The rule is well settled that the status of property as
community or separate is to be determined as of the date
of acquisition and that if it is separate property at that
time it will remain separate property through all of its
changes and transitions as long as it can be traced and
identified; and further, that its rents, issues and profits
remain separate property."' 6
Thus it may be stated that movable marital property will
10. MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 185-187 (1st
ed. 1952); Goodrich, MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE, 27 Yale L. J. 49 (1917);
Leflar, Community Property and the Conflict of Laws, 21 Calif. L. Rev. 221(1933); Stumberg, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 11 Texas L.
Rev. 53 (1932).
11. See e.g., Glenn v. Glenn, 47 Ala. 204 (1872); Mason v. Fuller, 36 Conn.
160 (1869); Ford's Curator v. Ford, 2 Mart. N.S. 574, 14 Am. Dec. 201 (1824);
Connor v. Connor, 10 La. Ann. 440 (1855); Routh v. Routh, 9 Rob. 224, 41
Am. Dec. 326 (La. 1845).
12. DeNichols v. Curlier, 2 Ch. 410 (1900).
13. 5 Mart. 569 (La. 1827).
14. 79 N.D. 561, 58 N.W.2d 765 (1953).
15. Burch v. Rice, 37 Wash. 2d. 185, 222 P.2d 847 (1950).
16. Id. at 849.
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be governed by the law of the domicile of the spouses at the
time of its original acquisition and any property exchanged
therefore in a subsequent domicile will be governed by the law
affecting the original property. It quite logically follows that
property acquired by husband and wife while domiciled in a
separate property state will remain separate even after their
domicile is removed to a community property state.1 7 Calif-
ornia attempted to change this long standing rule by enacting
a statute which made any property brought into California
community property if when acquired it would have been com-
munity had the purchaser been domiciled in California.' This
statute was held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
of California in the case of In Re Thornton's Estate9 as a
violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the United
States Constitution.
Quite obviously, it must also be true that movables acquired
in a community property state which are subsequently taken
to a separate property state will retain their community char-
acteristics although they may be there traded for other prop-
erty.20 The curious situation then arises in which a state en-
tirely unfamiliar with community property may be called upon
to enforce a community interest, which being foreign in na-
ture, the state has not the proper judicial machinery to handle.
This problem has generally been solved bythe application of a
constructive trust to one-half of the property."
Another point of particular interest becomes apparent when
spouses domiciled in a community property state attempt to
divide such property into the separate property of each by
their own action. It was held by the Texas Supreme Court2
2
that spouses domiciled in Texas could not, by dividing $5800
in cash in a non-community state, divest such property of its
community characteristics. The court however, granted the
17. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930); Douglas v.
Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912); Huff v. Borland, 6 La. Ann. 436
(1851); Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907); RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 293 (1934).
18. Calif. Civ. Code § 164 (1917) "All other property acquired after mar-
riage by either husband or wife, or both, including . . . personal property
wherever situated, acquired while domiciled elsewhere, which would not
have been the separate property of either if domiciled in this state, is
community property .... "
19. 1 Cal. 2d. 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
20 and 21-No reference-Eliminated by printer to expedite production.




partition on the basis that there was "some new dealing" in
accordance with the Restatement. 2 3 Texas has subsequently
changed its statute to permit a division of community prop-
erty.24 Generally, most community property states presently
allow partition of the community property by the parties.
2 5
IM MOVABLES
The general rule regarding immovables is subject to the
same restrictions as that concerning movables. That is, the rule
of original acquisition.26 Thus, community real property ex-
changed for real property in a separate property state will re-
tain its community property characteristics. This too may be
enforced by the common law state by the use of a constructive
trust.
27
The rule that the law of the situs applies to realty is one
jealously guarded by the state courts. In Hammonds v. Com-
missioner,2s the court held that realty purchased by a non-
domiciliary spouse during coverture by his "toil, talent, or
productive faculty," was community property. The court rea-
soned that the community property statute in Texas was a
real statute; that it operated on things, and not persons. The
basis for this holding seems to be that the purchase was not
made with separate funds, but rather with labor. This then
being the "original acquistion," it is entirely in accord with
the general rule. Louisiana probably has the strictest rule
regarding property within its jurisdiction in that the original
acquisition rule is partially rejected. The Louisiana Code"9
provides:
"All property acquired in this state by non-resident
married persons, whether the title thereto be in the name
of either the husband or wife or in their joint names, shall
be subject to the same provisions of the law which reg-
23. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 291 (1934).
24. Vernon's Texas Stat. art. 4624 a (1949).
25. See, e.g., Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932); In re
Nielson's Estate, 16 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1961); Rev. Code Wash. Ann. § 123.080.
26. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 239, 284 Pac. 158, 159 (1930); Joiner
v. Joiner, 131 Tex. 27, 112 S.W.2d 1049 (1938).
27. Heir of Dolan v. Murdock, 41 La. Ann. 494, 6 So. 131 (1889); Chiches-
ter v. Chichester, 209 Miss. 628, 48 So.2d 123 (1950); Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo.
314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848).
28. 106 F.2d 420 (10th cir. 1939).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 2400 (1870).
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ulate the community of acquets and gains between the
citizens of this state."
This Louisiana law can be distinguished most satisfactorily
from the previous unconstitutional California law in that it
applies only to property acquired in Louisiana" and appears
to be a strict application of lex rei sitae.
RENTS AND PROFITS, ETC.
In most civil and common law jurisdictions, income from
property is deemed a separate movable at the time it accrues.
Thus, the law of the domicile of the spouses would determine
whether the movable so acquired is separate or community.
31
Under Texas law however, all rents, profits and issues derived
from Texas land are community property even though the
land may be separate property and regardless of owners domi-
cile.3 2 All future acquisitions with this income must then be
necessarily community property. Louisiana, quite understand-
ably, is in accord with this rule.
3
The following sections shall deal with two particular areas
of conflict of laws concerning the enforcement of decrees pur-
porting to make property settlements respecting assets held
by the family prior to dissolution of the marriage. The first
of these is alimony and the second deals with decrees attempt-
ing to convey or require conveyance of real property located
within another jurisdiction.
ALIMONY
Most states, in providing for a distribution of property upon
dissolution of the marriage, also provide for alimony to be paid
for the maintenance of one of the parties and the children.
3 4
Alimony by its inherent nature is often a continuing thing, re-
quiring payments at regular intervals. The enforcement of
such a creature must necessarily involve difficulties in its ap-
plication to the conflict of laws. The Supreme Court of the
United States, beginning with its decision in Barber v. Bar-
30. See Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1923).
31. Supra note 29.
32. See Benjamin H. McElhinney Jr. 17 T.C. 7 (1951); Johnson v. Com-
missioner, 1 T.C. 1043 (1943).
33. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Crigler, 12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1942);
Drewett v. Carnahan, 183 So. 103 (La. App. 1938); Succession of Ferguson,
146 La. 1010, 848 So. 338 (1920).
34. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-24.
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ber,15 has held that alimony decrees are properly subject to
full faith and credit.36 Such a decree then, cannot be evaded
merely by fleeing the jurisdiction of the court. 7 The second
important case dealing with alimony decrees as they are to be
applied under the full faith and credit clause was Lynde v.
Lynde. 38 The court herein ruled that a judgment of alimony
in one state is a debt of record entitled to full faith and credit
in any other state, but it must be made a judgment in the sec-
ond state before it can be executed. 9 Further, if the decree
providing for future alimony was subject to the discretion of
the court, then an action brought upon that accrued alimony
was not properly entitled to full faith and credit.40 Subsequent-
ly, in Sistare v. Sistare, 41 the court held:
"Where a decree is rendered for alimony and is made
payable in future installments, the right to such install-
ments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming over-
due, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit
clause, provided no modification of the decree has been
made prior to the maturity of the installments...42
It was also added that this rule would not apply where the
first state in which the judgment was entered had such discre-
tion that no vested right could accrue. Sistare v. Sistare has
not been overruled and the courts of certain states,43 including
North Dakota,4 4 appear to have somewhat extended the rule in
deciding that future alimony accrued, if it has not actually
been modified, is final and will be granted full faith and credit.
While the rule in the Sistare case and subsequent decisions
gave the former spouse a remedy, it was a cumbersome and
difficult one to enforce. It necessitated the bringing of an ac-
tion in the particular jurisdiction in which the defaulting
spouse might be located, causing great inconvenience and ex-
35. -21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858).
36. U.S. Const. art. IV § 1.
37. Supra note 35 at 591 "The decree . . . is a judgment of record and
will be received as such by other courts . . . when that has been done, itbecomes a judicial debt of record against the husband which may be en-forced by execution or attachment against his person, issuing from the
court which gave the decree; and when that cannot be done on account ofthe husband having left or fled from that jurisdiction to another . . . the
wife, by her next friend, may sue him wherever he may be found . . . to
carry the decree into judgment there with the same effect that it has in
the state in which the decree was given."
38. 181 U.S. 183 (1900).
39. Id. at 187.
40. Id.
41. 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
42. Id. at 16 and 17.
43. See Holten v. Holten, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922).
44. Weldy v. Weldy, 74 N.D. 165, 20 N.W.2d 583 (1945.
1962]
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pense. It was only natural that some sort of uniform
law be promulgated, i.e., The Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act.45 This Act has been enacted in nearly
all the jurisdictions including North Dakota.46 It is not within
the purview of this article to discuss the intricacies of this Act.
There is much other adequate coverage of that subject.47 This
Act eliminates the necessity for the complaining spouse to per-
sonally commence an action in a foreign jurisdiction and pro-
vides an efficient and expedient method of reaching a non-
providing spouse in another state.
The subject of alimony as a result of this legislation is def-
initely not now an area of controversy in conflict of laws. A
bit of historical background and the present status does pre-
sent some view of this segment of the overall problem of prop-
erty settlement in the field of domestic relations in conflict of
laws.
ENFORCEMENT OF LAND DECREES IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
The enforcement of property settlements upon divorce, sep-
aration, or upon a subsequent action for a division of property
presents a variety of knotty problems. The greatest difficulty
in this area lies not with respect to movables but rather with
immovables. The rule is well settled that a court in one j uris-
diction cannot directly affect land located in a foreign juris-
diction.48 1
The constructive trust has been employed in certain par-
ticular instances, E.g., Texas courts in two cases charged one-
half the value of the husband's foreign lands to his lands lo-
cated within the forum.49 This device, however, will not solve
the problems most often encountered. It will more often be
necessary to resort to some more direct method.
Thus we enter one of the most difficult and confused areas
of the law i.e., the enforcement of a decree which purports to
convey real property located in another state. Since the early
45. 9 A U.L.A. 1 (1957).
46. See N.D. Cent. Code § 14-12 (1961).
47. See e.g. note, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
37 N.D. L. Rev. 421 (1961).
48. See e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Tolley v. Tolley, 210 Ark.
144, 194 S.w.2d 687 (1946); Rodgers V. Rodgers, 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac. 779
(1896); McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948); Higgins v.
Higgins, 60 S.D. 576, 245 N.W. 397 (1932).
49. Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Askew v.
Roundtree, 120 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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case of Penn v. Lord Baltimore,r° it has been an accepted rule
that the forum which obtains personal jurisdiction over the
parties may require a conveyance of property situated in an-
other jurisdiction. Unfortunately, if the party who has been
directed to make the conveyance flees the jurisdiction, failing
to execute the conveyance, the court decree is rendered power-
less since the court may not directly affect the title to foreign
real property. 51 Consequently the only solution by which such
a decree may be made effective is if the foreign court will give
the decree full faith and credit. Authorities in the field have
argued that such in personam judgments directing convey-
ances should be entitled to full faith and credit.
52
"If the defendant is personally before a court of equity,
the court has power to order him to convey foreign land.
Such a decree is an effective judgment and determines
conclusively his obligation to convey and this obligation
remains binding upon the person of the defendant where-
ever found. Such a decree ought to be entitled to full faith
and credit at the situs of the land." 53
The courts have not taken particular cognizance of these
views. The leading case dealing with this problem is Fall v.
Eastin.4 This case originally arose in Washington, wherein
the defendant was ordered to convey land in Nebraska pur-
suant to a divorce decree. The defendant left Washington be-
fore he could be compelled to execute the conveyance. An ac-
tion was then begun in Nebraska on the foreign judgment and
the trial court ruled to enforce the decree on the basis of full
faith and credit55 This decision was reversed on appeal.56 The
husband meanwhile conveyed to a third party and the case
came to the Supreme Court as Fall v. Eastin. 7 The Supreme
Court decided the case on the question whether a commission-
er's deed executed in Washington in favor of W was a valid
conveyance of the property and prevailed over the subsequent
purchaser. It was held that the judgment ought not to be en-
50. 1 Ves. 444. 27 Eng. Rep.- 1132 (Ch. 1750).
51. Supra note 48.
52. Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17
Mich. L Rev. 527 (1919); Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land
Decrees, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 620 (195.4); Lorenzen, Application of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of For-
eign Land, 34 Yale L.J. 591 (1925).
53. Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree,
supra note 52 at 532-533.
54. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
55. Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 104, 106 N.W. 412 (1906).
56. Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 120, 113 N.W. 175 (1907).
67. Supra note 54.
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titled to full faith and credit. Justice Holmes in his concurring
opinion apparently realized the real problem presented and
made the following observation:
"So I conceive that a Washington decree for the specific
performance of such a contract would be entitled to full
faith and credit as between the parties in Nebraska.' 58
Such specific performance decrees have often been given
effect at the situs when it can be shown that some pre-existing
obligation was in force.59 However, in the area of land divi-
sion upon divorce, the cases have been extremely reluctant to
give full faith and credit.6 0 On the other hand, the early case
of Matson v. Matson6 1 has been something of a guiding light
for those jurisdictions taking the opposite view. The facts in
this case are largely similar to those in Fall v. Eastin,62 but the
Iowa Court distinguished this case in that H, in the Fall Case
was not personally served nor did he appear. Further, herein
there was no conflict of the public policy.63 The Nebraska
Court since Fall v. Fall64 appears to have taken a somewhat
more liberal view. In the recent case of Weesner v. Weesner,6 5
the court distinguished Fall v. Fall in that Nebraska public
policy was no longer violated by this type of decree and that
the parties in this action had been personally served.
66
"It is well established that a court.., in one state with
all the necessary parties properly before it in an action for
divorce, generally has the power . . . to render a decree
ordering execution and delivery of a deed to property in
another state in lieu of alimony for the wife .. . if the re-
lated public policy of the situs state is in substantial ac-
cord with that of the other state. '61 7
In the recent case of McElreath v. McElreath,6' W sought
to have a Texas court enforce an Oklahoma decree directing H
to convey Texas land to her. The Texas court held that it
would enforce the Oklahoma decree on the basis of comity
58. Id. at 15.
59. See Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to
Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14
Minn. L. Rev. 494 (1930).
60. See Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N.J.Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676 (1894); Fall v.
-Fall, 75 Neb. 120, 113 N.W. 175 (1907).
61. 186 Iowa 607, 123 N.W. 127 (1919).
62. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
63. 75 Neb. 120, 113 N.W. 175 (1907).
64. Ibld.
65. 168 Neb. 346, 96 N.W.2d 682 (1959).
66. Id. at 689.
67. Id. at 689-690.
68. 345 S.W.2d 722 (Texas 1961).
484 [Vol. 38
MARITAL PROPERTY
rather than full faith and credit.69 This particular avenue of
approach has invoked some criticism70 since the court should
have had sufficient temerity to employ the stronger full faith
and credit. There would seem to be no logical basic for a situs
court, finding no contrary public policy, to refuse to give full
faith and credit to a decree rendered in personam by a for-
eign court having personal jurisdiction over the parties.
CONCLUSION
The area of conflict of laws in domestic relations generally,
is one confused and seemingly in need of uniformity. This is
particularly true with regard to property settlements wherein
substantial inequities'and hardships can result which were
not anticipated by the court granting the divorce or decree of
separation. It is, however, quite evident that the established
systems of law regarding property and marriage are not sus-
ceptible to any great change, and attempts at uniformity of
law in these areas would be met with substantial resistance.
The advance made with respect to alimony and support is a
great one and definitely a meritorious attempt to reduce un-
necessary conflict of laws problems.
KENNETH M. BROWN
69. Id. at 733.
70. See 50 Geo. L.J. 157 (1961).
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